This paper analyzes two different proposals, one by Ellis and Brundrit, based on classical relativistic cosmology, the other by Garriga and Vilenkin, based on the DH interpretation of quantum mechanics, both concluding that, in an infinite universe, planets and beings must be repeated an infinite number of times. We point to possible shortcomings in these arguments. We conclude that the idea of an infinite repetition of histories in space cannot be considered strictly speaking a consequence of current physics and (...) cosmology. Such ideas should be seen rather as examples of «ironic science» in the terminology of John Horgan. (shrink)

This paper analyzes two different proposals, one by Ellis and Brundrit, based on classical relativistic cosmology, the other by Garriga and Vilenkin, based on the DH interpretation of quantum mechanics, both concluding that, in an infinite universe, planets and beings must be repeated an infinite number of times. We point to possible shortcomings in these arguments. We conclude that the idea of an infinite repetition of histories in space cannot be considered strictly speaking a consequence of current physics and (...) cosmology. Such ideas should be seen rather as examples of «ironic science» in the terminology of John Horgan. (shrink)

The Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) field presents not only a landscape of theories but also a proliferation of approaches, which are controversial, complex and unclear. This article tries to clarify the situation, mapping the territory by classifying the main CSR theories and related approaches in four groups: (1) instrumental theories, in which the corporation is seen as only an instrument for wealth creation, and its social activities are only a means to achieve economic results; (2) political theories, which concern themselves (...) with the power of corporations in society and a responsible use of this power in the political arena; (3) integrative theories, in which the corporation is focused on the satisfaction of social demands; and (4) ethical theories, based on ethical responsibilities of corporations to society. In practice, each CSR theory presents four dimensions related to profits, political performance, social demands and ethical values. The findings suggest the necessity to develop a new theory on the business and society relationship, which should integrate these four dimensions. (shrink)

In spite of the thousands of articles on stakeholder theory, research on value creation has had a shorter history and narrower breadth. Only a few studies have researched value creation from stakeholder perspective looking at how stakeholders appropiate value or the processes or activities by which stakeholders create value. Consequently to date, certain questions still remain unanswered regarding how a firm should treat stakeholders in order to create value. Several questions arise specifically from the stakeholder's side: What does "value" mean (...) for a particular group of stakeholders and how do firms create these different types of value? How do we measure the value created by stakeholders? The purpose of this paper is to answer these questions from Amartya Sen's Capability Approach, identifying and measuring stakeholders' capabilities in the value creation process. Stakeholder Capability is the adequate concept for understanding stakeholder welfare rather than the utility function concept. The empirical evidence comes from an in-depth case study of the company The Grobo Group and its stakeholders. According to the results, the following stakeholder capabilities are relevant to value creation: being employable, being autonomus, being innovative, being entreprenurial, being responsive, being socially integrated, being emphatic, being "green" and being healthy. (shrink)

In stakeholder theory, most research on cooperation has been focused on inter-organizational collaboration field centered at the dyadic level, excluding the relational or network data. Relational or network data are important as the firms do not simply respond to each stakeholder individually but to an interaction of influences from the entire stakeholder set. The purpose of this article is to analyze the cooperation process among the firm and its stakeholders by considering the relational data and to describe the role of (...) the firm in such cooperation processes. The empirical evidence is provided by an inductive in-depth case study on the company 'Gas-Nat' and its stakeholders cooperating on the 'natural gas pipeline program' in Argentina. To do so, I combined both quantitative sociometric data and qualitative data from grounded theory and ethnographic observations. This research suggests a stakeholder cooperation model based on structural and relational factors. The results indicate that stakeholder cooperation is not just determined by stakeholder position, but they can vary depending on the political opportunity structure in the network and on the framing process. It was found that network structure may create a context for selective cooperation but doesn't explicitly determine it which is different from the previous research in stakeholder network literature. The role of the firm in the cooperation process was found as a tertius iungens role which implies to join, unite, or connect, and it is different from the existing prominent network literature of tertius gaudens. (shrink)

This book explores the epistemic side of racial and sexual oppression. It elucidates how social insensitivities and imposed silences prevent members of different groups from listening to each other.

This paper defends a contextualist approach to epistemic injustice according to which instances of such injustice should be looked at as temporally extended phenomena (having developmental and historical trajectories) and socially extended phenomena (being rooted in patterns of social relations). Within this contextualist framework, credibility excesses appear as a form of undeserved epistemic privilege that is crucially relevant for matters of testimonial justice. While drawing on Miranda Fricker's proportional view of epistemic justice, I take issue with its lack of attention (...) to the role that credibility excesses play in testimonial injustices. I depart from Fricker's view of the relation between credibility excesses and credibility deficits, and I offer an alternative account of the contributions that undeserved epistemic privileges make to epistemic injustices. Then, through the detailed analysis of To kill a mockingbird, I elucidate the crucial role played by the social imaginary in creating and sustaining epistemic injustices, developing an analysis of the kind of social blindness produced by an oppressive social imaginary that establishes unjust patterns of credibility excesses and deficits. (shrink)

In this paper, I present a systematic approach to stakeholder theory based on social capital: the stakeholder social capital approach. Social capital is a relatively novel concept in stakeholder theory, which in previous research was not properly defined or systematically developed. This paper aims to fill this gap by taking into account the specificities of the stakeholder theory, which implies an explicit consideration of values. Therefore, the stakeholder social capital concept is defined by four dimensions (relational, cognitive, structural and evaluative) (...) instead of three (relational, cognitive and structural). I present the stakeholder social capital approach according to Donaldson and Preston's distinction: the descriptive, instrumental and normative. The descriptive perspective implies mapping the stakeholder networks based on the four dimensions and implies a shift toward relationships rather than groups of stakeholders. The instrumental perspective based on the relational view focuses on the drivers of relational rents within the network (relational assets, knowledge routines, complementary resource endowments and effective governance) and the normative perspective aims to foster a relational view of society. (shrink)

In this paper, I present a systematic approach to stakeholder theory based on social capital: the stakeholder social capital approach. Social capital is a relatively novel concept in stakeholder theory, which in previous research was not properly defined or systematically developed. This paper aims to fill this gap by taking into account the specificities of the stakeholder theory, which implies an explicit consideration of values. Therefore, the stakeholder social capital concept is defined by four dimensions (relational, cognitive, structural and evaluative) (...) instead of three (relational, cognitive and structural). I present the stakeholder social capital approach according to Donaldson and Preston's distinction: the descriptive, instrumental and normative. The descriptive perspective implies mapping the stakeholder networks based on the four dimensions and implies a shift toward relationships rather than groups of stakeholders. The instrumental perspective based on the relational view focuses on the drivers of relational rents within the network (relational assets, knowledge routines, complementary resource endowments and effective governance) and the normative perspective aims to foster a relational view of society. (shrink)

En las sociedades modernas, un gran número de las decisiones que nos afectan descansan en los datos registrados en ficheros informatizados que contienen informaciones sobre millones de personas relativas a un amplio número de facetas de su vida. Para garantizar la dignidad, libertad y el pleno ejercicio de los derechos fundamentales frente al uso torticero de las nuevas tecnologías de la información, el artículo 18.4 de nuestra Constitución ha establecido una nueva garantía constitucional denominada tradicionalmente autodeterminación informativa. Este nuevo derecho (...) es configurado por nuestro Tribunal Constitucional como un derecho fundamental autónomo aunque estrechamente ligado al derecho a la intimidad y un derecho instrumental de garantía de otros derechos fundamentales. El contenido de este derecho es desarrollado en la nueva Ley de Protección de Datos Personales, la Ley Orgánica 15/1999, de 13 de diciembre, que sin duda aporta interesantes y positivas novedades. Sin embargo, al igual que sucedía en el caso de la L. O. 5/1992 LORTAD, siguen existiendo demasiadas sombras que pueden afectar al contenido esencial del derecho a la autodeterminación informativa y que impiden que efectivamente éste pueda cumplir su misión de garantizar la dignidad y la libertad de las personas en las nuevas sociedades de la información. (shrink)

Background The Regional Committee for Africa of the World Health Organization (WHO) in 2001 expressed concern that some health-related studies undertaken in the Region were not subjected to any form of ethics review. In 2003, the study reported in this paper was conducted to determine which Member country did not have a national research ethics committee (REC) with a view to guiding the WHO Regional Office in developing practical strategies for supporting those countries. Methods This is a descriptive study. The (...) questionnaire was prepared and sent by diplomatic pouch to all the 46 Member States in the WHO African Region, through the WHO country representatives, for facilitation and follow up. The data were entered in Excel spreadsheet and subsequently exported to STATA for analysis. A Chi-Squared test (χ 2) for independence was undertaken to test the relationship between presence/absence of Research Ethics Committee (REC) and selected individual socioeconomic and health variables. Results The main findings were as follows: the response rate was 61% (28/46); 64% (18/28) confirmed the existence of RECs; 36% (10/28) of the respondent countries did not have a REC (although 80% of them reported that they had in place an ad hoc ethical review mechanism); 85% (22/26) of the countries that responded to this question indicated that ethical approval of research proposals was, in principle, required; and although 59% of the countries that had a REC expected it to meet every month, only 44% of them reported that the REC actually met on a monthly basis. In the Chi-Squared test, only the average population in the group of countries with a REC was statistically different (at 5% level of significance) from that of the group of countries without a REC. Conclusion In the current era of globalized biomedical research, good ethics stewardship demands that every country, irrespective of its level of economic development, should have in place a functional research ethics review system in order to protect the dignity, integrity and safety of its citizens who participate in research. (shrink)

Este artículo aborda el antiguo problema de la diferencia entre filosofía y poesía partiendo de una interpretación del arte narrativo personificado por Ulises en la Odisea. Una lectura del episodio de las Sirenas permite reconstruir la trama de voces diversas que compone el relato homérico y comprender la significación de esta estructura polifónica en el imaginario odiseico. Frente a la neta oposición entre autofonía y alofonía que propone la filosofía platónica, la poesía homérica implica una idea de heterofonía que apunta (...) más allá de una lógica binaria y sugiere la irreductibilidad de la voz poética a un juego entre extremos contrarios. La heterofonía consiste más bien en una voz figural que crea la «lógica difusa» del mundo ficcional mediante la neutralización de las diferencias entre sujetos enunciativos. (shrink)

Based on published works and unpublished materials, this article analyses how cybernetics was received by two Spanish thinkers exiled in Mexico: José Gaos (1900–1969) and Eduardo Nicol (1907–1990). This reception is particularly intriguing especially when considering the substantial presence and social impact that Norbert Wiener had in Mexican society because of his friendship with Arturo Rosenblueth. Gaos and Nicol are the first philosophers to develop a complex and original diagnosis of cybernetics in Mexico. It will be shown how the exiled (...) thinkers take on the philosophical implications of this science in the light of their respective theoretical projects, and finally, it will be defended how the critical perspective they develop is particularly significant for Mexico’s political and academic context since it illuminates some negative aspects of cybernetics that Wiener did not foresee and that had not been reported there until then. (shrink)

In this paper I will argue that when Aristotle uses the word ‘ἀρχή’ he is often referring to what we call a condition, whether necessary, sufficient or necessary and sufficient. To this end I will discuss how conditions for being, change, and knowledge, as identified by Aristotle, can be equated to ontological, physical and noetic principles, respectively.

1 Domains of application 2 Formulating the conceptual/nonconceptual distinction 3 Is there such a thing as nonconceptual content? 4 Developing the account of nonconceptual content .

In this chapter, I outline what philosophers working on the ethics of immigration have had to say with regard to invidious discrimination. In doing so, I look at both instances of direct discrimination, by which I mean discrimination that is explicitly stated in official immigration policy, and indirect discrimination, by which I mean cases where the implementation or enforcement of facially “neutral” policies nonetheless generate invidious forms of discrimination. The end goal of this chapter is not necessarily to take a (...) side, but to outline the terrain and provide the reader with an adequate entryway into these philosophical discussions over discrimination and immigration. (shrink)

This article argues that bodily awareness is a basic form of self-consciousness through which perceiving agents are directly conscious of the bodily self. It clarifies the nature of bodily awareness, categorises the different types of body-relative information, and rejects the claim that we can have a sense of ownership of our own bodies. It explores how bodily awareness functions as a form of self-consciousness and highlights the importance of certain forms of bodily awareness that share an important epistemological property with (...) canonical forms of self-consciousness such as introspection. (shrink)

It is now 25 years since Gareth Evans introduced the distinction between conceptual and nonconceptual content in The Varieties of Reference. This is a fitting time to take stock of what has become a complex and extended debate both within philosophy and at the interface between philosophy and psychology. Unfortunately, the debate has become increasingly murky as it has become increasingly ramified. Much of the contemporary discussion does not do full justice to the powerful theoretical tool originally proposed by Evans (...) and subsequently refined by theorists in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s – most effectively, I think, by Christopher Peacocke (particularly in his 1992). Even worse, significant parts of the discussion are somewhat confused. This paper makes a start on clarifying what I think ought to be the central issues in debates about nonconceptual content. I begin in §1 by pointing out how narrowly focused contemporary discussion is relative to Evans’s original discussion. We are not making as much use as we should of nonconceptual content as a tool for understanding subpersonal information processing and the complexities of its status relative to perception and thought at the personal level. In §2 I turn to what is the central focus of contemporary discussion, namely, the content of perception and identify a “master argument” for nonconceptualism based on the relation between conceptual capacities and capacities for perceptual discrimination. The aim of §3 is to clarify the relation between the claim that perception has nonconceptual content and some superficially similar claims discussed by philosophers of perception. Finally, in §4 I explain why the attention recently focused on what is sometimes called the state version of the nonconceptualist thesis seems to me to be misdirected. (shrink)

Philosophical accounts of self-deception can be divided into two broad groups – the intentionalist and the anti-intentionalist. On intentionalist models what happens in the central cases of self-deception is parallel to what happens when one person intentionally deceives another, except that deceiver and deceived are the same person. This paper offers a positive argument for intentionalism about self-deception and defends the view against standard objections.